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Multinational Firms and the Development of
the Iranian Oil Industry*
KARIM PAKRAVAN**
Between late 1973 and early 1974, the foreign oil industry was
subjected to revolutionary economic changes. Crude oil pricing
decisions, traditionally initiated by the international oil compa-
nies, were taken over by the OPEC' members. . . .The OPEC
members quadrupled the price of crude oil, and the OAPEC
2
members cut back production and put an embargo on shipments
to the United States for political purposes. These actions set in
motion radical changes in national energy policies, in interna-
tional balance of payments, and in the role of multinational oil
companies. The age of inexpensive oil and of market determina-
tion of petroleum prices and outputs had passed.'
The effects of the revolutionary decisions initiated by the
oil producing countries in the early 1970's upon the OPEC
members themselves were scarcely less profound than those
felt by the oil consuming world. The hitherto exploited produc-
ing countries suddenly found in their hands not only a poten-
tially destructive weapon in terms of joint pricing and produc-
ing decisions, but also opportunities to restructure their rela-
tionships with the multinational oil firms.' Iran took advantage
of this opportunity, replacing the Iranian Consortium Agree-
ment5 with a long term supply contract that brought all oil
operations in Iran under the direct control of the Iranian gov-
ernment through its agent, the NIOC." This agreement, in con-
* Editor's note: The reader will note that this article was written prior to the
occurrence of the events which have recently transpired in Iran.
** Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Free University of Iran.
M.S., 1972, London School of Economics; Ph.D., Econ., 1976, University of Chicago.
1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
3. N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 301 (1974).
4. A multinational firm is one owning producing assets in at least two countries,
and, in the case of the "Majors" (British Petroleum, Exxon, Shell, Gulf, Texaco,
Mobil, Socal), many more than two countries.
5. Under the terms of the consortium agreement, the seven "Majors" participated
in predetermined percentages: British Petroleum (40%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), the
five U. S. Majors (7% each), eleven independent oil companies, known as IRICON
(5%), and the Companies Franqaises des Pktroles (CFP) (6%) in exploration and pro-
duction of all petroleum within the consortium area (100,000 square kilometers). The
Iranian royalty was fixed at 12.5% of total revenue, and in addition, shared equally in
net profits. The effect of the consortium in financial terms was enormous: an immedi-
ate tripling of Iran's per barrel revenue (from twenty-five to eighty cents per barrel).
6. National Iranian Oil Company. Under the supply contracts presently in effect,
the NIOC sells petroleum to the consortium at a posted price per barrel, usually
including a minor discount to the multinationals with whom Iran formerly dealt on a
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junction with the joint venture contract,7 (used primarily with
independent oil companies), and the newer service contracts,'
gives Iran unprecedented control over the production and sale
of its oil.' However, Iran, just as all OPEC members, does not
concession basis. The discount is partly used by the consortium to make loans to NIOC
to cover its capital outlays. NIOC is presently renegotiating this purchase agreement
because of its dissatisfaction with the consortium's performance, especially concerning
the "minimum offtake program," whereby the consortium agreed to purchase a mini-
mum amount every year.
7. Under the typical joint venture contract, the government acts in its sovereign
capacity and as a partner in the venture. The joint venture pays taxes to the sovereign
based upon a predetermined percentage of revenue (usually 50%). The government
then, as a partner, again takes some 50% of the remaining profit with a result that the
percentage of profit is 75%-25% in favor of the producing country.
8. The service contract is coming into increasing use throughout the world, but
as yet there is no information available on the net benefits accruing under it to the
host government. Under a service contract, the producing country bears the economic
risk of discovery and owns all production assets. The multinational firm supplies the
technical and managerial expertise of discovery, refining, and marketing for a fee,
usually a percentage of the profit.
9. In a comparative analysis (using these variables: financial return to producing
countries, national sovereignty, and conservation), it seems from available data that
the joint venture regime is more favorable to the producing country than the concession
regime, which was so widely used in the period from 1954-1973, principally in the
consortium agreement.
While, as the following table suggests, the concession regime is slightly more
favorable in terms of financial return,
Table 1
Per barrel disposable Revenue Received
by Iran (cents per barrel)
Producer 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Consortium 80 83 123 133 164 860-960
SIRIP 22 22 22 25 28 24 n.a.
IPAC 40 33 29 51 75 88 n.a.
IMINICO - 24 31 39 66 106 n.a.
LAPCO 18 29 52 89 100 144 n.a.
NIOC 140 200 174 182 200 348 1336
the difference decreases as the price of oil increases. F. FEsHARAKI, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY (1976).
However, in terms of conservation, the joint venture regime appears clearly supe-
rior. Conservation may be defined as lower production and/or investment in order to
maintain or increase capacity. Two indices that are useful in presenting the relative
conservation efforts of the two regimes are the cumulative drilling-production ratio
(CDPR) and the ultimate reserves-cumulative production ratio (URCPR). Generally,
a higher CDPR will mean a greater effort in maintaining or increasing capacity, while
a lower URCPR will mean a greater effort in conserving the resource through lower
production. Although these indices have not been adjusted for any qualitative differ-
ences in the oil bearing fields, considering the fact that every oil region included
belongs to the same oil basin, these indices do retain explanatory power.
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yet possess the technical knowledge necessary to properly con-
duct all phases of oil production, from upstream to downstream
activities.10 The multinationals, on the other hand, possess a
Table 2
Cumulative Drilling-Production
Ratio
(Meter/thousand cu. m)
1960-73 1973-76
Consortium* .57 .92
SIRIP 9.7 2.08
IPAC 3.32 3.24
Computed on the basis of NIOC annual reports 1960-76.
*OSCO after 1973.
This table indicates a better performance for the two joint ventures considered
than for the consortium, even bearing in mind the superior quality of the consortium
oil fields.
Table 3
Cumulative Production-Reserves Ratio
Ultimate Cumulative
Cumulative Proven Production
Production Reserves Ultimate
(million) (million) Reserves
bbls bbls Ratio
Consortium 28084 80850 .34
IPAC 299 2457 .12
SIRIP 126 2113 .60
LAPCO 484 1500 .32
Based on a field compilation. Data reported in 1976.
The figure for LAPCO is lowered by the fact that it does not include ulti-
mate reserves for Bahram field, for which no data is available.
Table three indicates a better performance for IPAC and SIRIP than the consor-
tium and LAPCO in terms of a slower depletion of oil reserves.
Conservation is here considered of primary importance because effective resource
management is essential to increase the life of the exhaustible oil supply, and thereby
increase the transition phase from a world economy based on exhaustible fossil fuels
to one based upon an inexhaustible source of energy, such as solar or geothermal
energy. Such a lengthened transition phase is essential to help prevent the disastrous
effects on the world economy that can be expected if the fossil fuels are too rapidly
depleted.
10. Upstream activities consist of exploratory and development activities, such as
geological and geophysical search activities, drilling of exploratory and development
wells, and arranging the technical infrastructure. Midstream activities include the
transportation of oil by pipeline and/or tanker ships. Downstream activities consist of
refining and marketing.
1979
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virtual monopoly over this technical and managerial know-
how. As such technology cannot practically be developed over
the short run, Iran will continue to be dependent upon the
multinationals to properly exploit its oil reserves. This necessi-
tates a discussion of the proper role for the multinational oil
firm in Iran on terms that will maximize the benefits to the
producing country. In this connection, the following fields may
be identified in which foreign operator assistance will continue
to be necessary over the short run: provision of technology in
upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, and the
provision of capital. In what follows, each will be analyzed in
turn.
I. PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY
Given that foreign oil firms (and this includes independent
as well as multinational oil firms) have a virtual monopoly on
the technology of upstream, midstream, and downstream oper-
ations, as well as the fact that the development of such technol-
ogy is a long and costly process, the solution for Iran would
seem to include the purchase of technical services from foreign
firms while simultaneously developing its own technology. The
development of technology does not mean the importing or
even building of, for example, drilling platforms, but furthering
research and development that can expand on the existing
Iranian technological base. Engaging in this course of action
would require the creation of a general policy of fostering re-
search and development through various incentives, especially
incentives for private industry. This program in the long run
will decrease reliance on foreign operators at all stages of the
extraction process. This, in turn, will allow Iran to maximize
the benefits from the exploitation of Iranian oil." However, in
the short run, the multinational oil firm will continue to play
a large role in the various processes of developing the Iranian
oil reserves. This role can be better understood by examining
each step in the development process.
A. Upstream Operations
In the initial stage of geological and geothermal explora-
11. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5344 (1962). This resolution recognized that
complete and permanent sovereignity over all natural resources rests with the people
of the state in which such resources lie. This of course recognizes Iran's right to exploit
its vast petroleum reserves for its own benefit.
VOL. 8:335
MULTINATIONAL OIL FIRMS IN IRAN
tion, the crucial factor is the availability of trained personnel.
The NIOC can therefore immediately take over all such activi-
ties, and simply procure the necessary human expertise.
The next step in the exploratory process is the drilling of
exploratory and development wells. This does require sophisti-
cated technology unavailable on a large scale. The interna-
tional drilling industry is highly competitive and, therefore,
quite cost efficient. This invites, on at least a short and me-
dium run basis, the purchase from the foreign operators of such
services until the Iranian domestic drilling industry reaches a
level of technological sophistication that will allow it to com-
pete with foreign operations.
B. Midstream Operations
In the transportation of oil in pipelines, the construction
12. There is also significant evidence that prior to the drastic OPEC pricing deci-
sions of 1973, the oil industry as a whole had begun to enter an era of freer competition.
(See, e.g., N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 299 (1974), for a view that crude oil prices
had become essentially market-determined rather than supplier-announced, in the
major consuming nations in the period from 1957-1973.) This can be seen from a
presentation of the changes in the concentration of the foreign oil in industry in the
period for 1953 to 1972:
Table 4
Summary of Changes in Concentration of the Foreign Oil Industry
By Division, 1953 and 1972
1953 1972
"Seven "Seven
Largest" All Other Largest" All Other
Division Companies Companies Companies Companies
of the Combined Combined Combined Combined
Industry (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Area of Operation 64 36 24 76
Proven Reserves 92 8 67 33
Production 78 13 71 29
Refining Capacity 73 27 49 51
Tanker Capacity 29 71 19 81
Product Marketing 72 28 54 46
Id.
However, the tendency of the foreign suppliers to control supply through a mecha-
nism known as the Aggregated Programmed Quantity Agreement between the mem-
bers of the Iran Consortium (that is, the seven Majors), as well as the tight control of
marketing outlets by the majors may make such competition more illusory than real.
1979
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of the pipeline can be taken over in the long run by the domes-
tic industry. However, until it becomes large enough to under-
take such enormous projects, such construction projects will
have to be contracted out to foreign construction firms. The
actual naval transfer of petroleum is entirely another matter.
The oil tanker business is becoming increasingly risky. Large
fluctuations in tanker rates in the past year have been very
burdensome both to shipbuilders and tanker fleet owners.
There is, of course, the further risk of pollution of the marine
environment by tankers. Given the strong competition in the
international oil tanker business, as well as the enormous capi-
tal expenditures necessary to build a fleet, a more prudent
policy would be to simply purchase necessary tanker services.
C. Downstream Operations
These operations, consisting of refining and marketing,
require the greatest amounts of technical, financial, and mana-
gerial expertise. It is this facet of the oil development process
that seems to be the most dependent upon foreign oil opera-
tives. This supplies the foreign multinational oil firm offering
such expertise a powerful lever in negotiating with producing
countries. In this area, then, special emphasis in developing a
domestic industry would seem to offer great benefits to Iran.
This must be viewed in terms of development in the long run,
as the tremendous financial and intellectual efforts required
preclude short term development. Viable alternatives in the
refining industry would seem to be (in additon to a gradual
development of Iranian refineries), the purchase, in joint ven-
ture contracts, of refining services abroad, or simply to allow
the crude oil to be refined abroad by the foreign multinationals,
as is presently the case.
Marketing presents a more formidable challenge. Al-
though by 1977, NIOC was exporting (marketing) directly
1,165 TBD,13 this was mostly to Eastern Bloc and Third World
Countries." However, the traditional control of marketing and
distribution by the Majors in the Western consuming countries
has thus far prevented the development of large scale market-
13. Thousand barrels daily.
14. For instance, NIOC recently entered into joint ventures for refineries in both
India and South Africa, as well as concluding barter deals with Brazil (oil for industrial
and agricultural goods involving approximately one billion U.S. dollars) and various
Comecon countries.
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ing activities in such countries. It would appear to be a very
risky and costly undertaking to attempt to preempt a share of
this potentially vast market for Iranian oil. This is true not only
due to the risks inherent in such an enterprise, but also because
of the vast distribution structure that would have to be set up
and staffed. While certainly possible and promising in the long
run, in the immediate future, the multinational oil firm will
continue to play the key role in the refining and marketing of
crude oil.
II. PROVISION OF CAPITAL
The oil industry is capital intensive. This is true not only
because of the tremendous amount of assets necessary to con-
duct even the most modest of operations, but also because the
oil industry is entering an irreversibly increasing cost phase.'5
While Iranian oil revenues are high," they are largely ear-
marked for domestic economic development. Thus, most of the
required capital for further resource development must be pro-
vided by the international petroleum industry. The incentives
necessary to attract the vast amounts of capital required can
be included in the joint venture and long term supply con-
tracts.
III. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the revolutionary economic changes
wrought by the OPEC cartel action of 1973, oil producing coun-
tries as a whole are beginning to redefine their relationships
15. This is caused by the increasing difficulty of locating and extracting a scarce
resource in an industry where the lowest cost oil fields (such as the one exploited by
the Iran Consortium) are all but gone. The search for oil thus must lead to more
offshore drilling and similar costly operations. Of course, world inflation also serves to
increase cost. The following table graphically demonstrates the rapidly increasing
investment per daily barrel, which is an index of the average cost of investment in
capacity for the period 1972-1976.
Table 5
Investment per daily barrel
US $/daily barrel
1973 1974 1975 1976
World 275 415 447 548
Middle East 40 46 52 94
16. Oil revenues for the OPEC countries in 1974 as a result of the pricing decisions
were an additional $60 billion due the OPEC countries from the consuming nations,
N. JACOBY, supra note 12, at 302 (1974).
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with the multinational oil firms, who formerly controlled not
only production, but pricing decisions as well. However, de-
spite the new found control of production and pricing by oil
producing countries, the very nature of the industry, (one re-
quiring very sophisticated technical, financial, and managerial
expertise) mandates a continued active role in the Middle East
industry by the multinational oil firms possessing the neces-
sary expertise.
Iran, over the long run, must work to maximize the bene-
fits derivable from its vast oil reserves by developing its own
technology, especially in the areas of upstream research and
discovery and downstream marketing. This will require a vast
national effort concentrating on expanding and enriching the
existing Iranian base to include the necessary technical, mana-
gerial, and investment know-how needed to make Iran a full
participant in the Middle East oil industry.
